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NOTES 
RESTRICTING THE MIRANDA 
PRESUMPTION AND PRUNING THE 
POISONOUS TREE: OREGON V. ELST AD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March, 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Oregon v. 
Elstad. 1 The Supreme Court held that a second confession was 
admissible into evidence despite the fact that a first un-
Mirandized custodial confession was obtained a short time ear-
lier.2 Although the initial unwarned confession was suppressed 
pursuant to Miranda, 3 the Court refused to extend the Miranda 
presumption of coercion to the second confession.4 The second 
confession was admissible because the Court found that the de-
fendant, after being advised of his rights, had voluntarily waived 
those rights. II According to the Court, the initial violation of Mi-
randa was technical or inadvertant;6 therefore, the violation did 
not taint the subsequent Mirandized confession.? Furthermore, 
the Court established that the conditionS that was created by 
the technical violation of Miranda was cured9 when the police 
officers administered thorough Miranda warnings to the accused 
and he waived his rights. 10 
1. 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985). 
2. Id. at 1296. 
3. Id. at 1293. 
4. Id. at 1292. 
5. Id. at 1293. 
6. Id. at 1296-97. 
7. [d. at 1298. 
8. In Elstad, the technical violation of Miranda was deemed a condition as opposed 
to an illegality. Id. at 1296. Thorough Miranda warnings would ordinarily cure this con-
dition.ld. 
9. See supra note 8. 
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The Elstad decision is significant because the Court elimi-
nated the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine ll with regard to 
Miranda violations, if the secondary evidence is a subsequent 
confession.12 As a result of Elstad, before a court will apply the 
derivative evidence rule13 to the secondary evidence,14 a suspect 
11. The fruit of the poisonous tree, or derivative evidence doctrine, was established 
in Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In Silverthorne, 
the Court ruled that evidence obtained through a constitutional violation could not be 
used in court, and moreover, the evidence obtained could not be used in any way. [d. at 
392. The Court did not want the government to profit from its own wrongdoing. If the 
government were allowed to use evidence obtained as an exploitation of a constitutional 
violation, then the exclusionary rule would lose much, if not all, of its force and the 
fourth amendment would be reduced to a "form of words." [d. The crux of the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine is the determination that a defendant's constitutional rights 
have been violated; this decision will allow suppression of evidence obtained through an 
exploitation of the violation. [d. 
There are certain exceptions to the derivative evidence rule. One exception, the in-
dependent source doctrine, was established in Silverthorne. Id. If the government can 
obtain the secondary evidence independently of the primary violation of a defendant's 
rights, then the evidence may be admitted into evidence. Id. "If knowledge of [the sec-
ondary evidence) is gained from an independent source [the secondary evidence] may be 
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own wrong can-
not be used by it in the way proposed." Id. 
Seventeen years later, the Court established the attenuation theory in Nardone v. 
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1937). This theory was based upon the proximity of the 
secondary evidence, which the defendant sought to have excluded, to the primary viola-
tion of his fourth amendment rights. If the secondary evidence obtained through the 
primary violation does not have a causal connection to the primary violation of the rights 
of the defendant, then the taint of the primary violation is attenuated and the secondary 
evidence is admissible. Id. at 341. The issue was whether the secondary evidence had 
come by exploitation of the primary violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. [d. 
at 340-41. Over the years, the attenuation theory has been refined to a number of factors 
to be viewed in determining if the secondary evidence has a causal connection to the 
primary violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.s. 590 (1975). These factors include: the tem-
poral proximity between the original violation and the secondary evidence, the presence 
or absence of intervening events, and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the offi-
cial misconduct. Id. at 603-04. 
Thirty·seven years after Nardone, the Court established the final exception to the 
derivative evidence rule-the inevitable discovery theory. Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 
2501 (1984). In Nix, evidence that the police would have discovered anyway, as the result 
of an ongoing police investigation, was admissible despite the fact that a primary viola-
tion of the defendant's rights led to the secondary evidence. Id. at 2511-12. The idea was 
to put the parties in the same position that they would have been in without the primary 
illegality. This is accomplished by not setting aside convictions that would have been 
obtained even without police misconduct. [d. at 2509. "Suppression, in these circum-
stances, [inevitable discovery] would do nothing whatever to promote the integrity of the 
trial process, but would inflict a wholly unacceptable burden on the administration of 
justice." Id. at 2511. 
12. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1295. 
13. See supra note 11. 
14. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294. 
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in custody must prove there was actual coercionl5 by the police 
when they obtained the initial statement. This Note will discuss 
the Elstad decision and the impact it will have on criminal 
procedure. 
II. BACKGROUND 
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the historic Mi-
randa case. IS This decision afforded lower courts, struggling with 
the admission of confessions on a case-by-case, totality of the 
circumstances basis, a clear standard for determining if a confes-
sion was admissible. 17 According to Miranda, if a defendant is in 
15. Id. at 1296. 
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). At issue in Miranda was whether a 
confessiun, that the police obtained from a suspect in custody through interrogation 
techniques without advising the defendant of his rights, was voluntary. Id. On March 13, 
1963, the petitioner, Ernest Miranda was arrested and taken into custody for kidnapping 
and rape. At trial, the police officers admitted that the petitioner was not advised of his 
rights. Id. at 491. The confession contained a statement that the confession was volun-
tary, and that the petitioner fully understood his legal rights. Id. at 492. The Supreme 
Court reversed the finding that Miranda had voluntarily confessed and that he had 
waived his rights. Id. The Court determined that the conduct of the police in obtaining 
the waiver and confession did not approach the constitutional standards necessary for a 
knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. 
17. In the United States, the original rules of confession admissibility precluded the 
use of a confession as evidence if it was obtained through torture or other means of 
compulsory self-incrimination. O. STEPHENS. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF 
GUILT 22-23 (1973). The rationale was that if such means were employed, the confession 
was not trustworthy. Id. Next, the courts utilized a voluntariness test that was the pre-
cursor to the modern voluntariness test. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884). Subse-
quently, confession analysis moved away from the voluntary test and courts began to 
view the police methods in obtaining the confession in question. Brown v. Mississippi, 
297 U.S. 278 (1936); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). The police methods test was 
instituted in response to flagrant police abuse while the police interrogated black men 
accused of rape in the South. Id. Then, confession analysis gradually started to turn back 
to the voluntary test. The Supreme Court started to utilize an "inherently coercive" test. 
If the circumstances surrounding the confession were inherently coercive, the confession 
was inadmissible. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). The basic idea was to pre-
serve the integrity of the fact-finding system. Id. 
In most cases, police interrogation techniques had developed from crude forms of 
physical abuse of the 1930's to subtle psychological questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
448. A court faced with the question of admissibility of a confession was in a difficult 
position. How was a court to measure the psychological impact upon a defendant in 
determining whether a confession was coerced, and thus, not trustworthy? In response to 
this dilemma, the Supreme Court developed a two-prong analysis; the Court viewed the 
trustworthiness of the confession and the police methods in obtaining the confession to 
determine if the confession was admissible. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
In 1963, the Court moved away from the two-prong test and again began to utilize a 
voluntary, due process test. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Haynes v. Washing-
3
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custody18 and interrogated,i9 "the prosecution may not use 
statements ... unless it demonstrate[s] the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation."20 The states must employ a fully effective means of ap-
prising a defendant of his constitutional rights.21 Unless these 
rights are scrupulously honored, a defendant must be advised of 
his rights in the well-known Miranda warnings.22 A suspect in 
custody may not be interrogated unless he is advised of his Mi-
randa rights; he must fully understand his rights,23 and he must 
freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waive these rights. If the dic-
tates of the Miranda warnings are violated by a suspect's inter-
rogators, the statements obtained during the interrogation are 
irrebuttably presumed coerced; therefore, the statements are 
inadmissible into evidence because there has been a violation of 
ton, an u.s. 503 (1963). A confession was admissible if it was deemed voluntary based 
upon the total facts of the case. [d. at 513. The problem with the voluntary test was that 
the courts were continually litigating the question of voluntariness, and the inevitable 
swearing contest with regard to the facts was usually resolved in favor of the police. O. 
STEPHENS. supra, at 10-11 (1973). Another problem with the voluntariness test was that 
coercion and involuntariness were state of the art terms. The normal dictionary meaning 
of the words did not apply. A defendant was required to show a greater level of coercion 
than was actually needed to show the confession was compelled within the meaning of 
the privilege against self-incrimination. Kamisar, Heavy Blow Delivered By Miranda De-
ci.~i()ns, 7 NAT'L L.J. 51 (Sept. 2, 1985). Thus, there was a gap in confessions law. A 
defendant may have been coerced within the meaning of the fifth amendment but not 
within the meaning of the voluntary test. In response, the Court adopted the Miranda 
safeguard to ensure that a defendant's fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination 
were honored. 
18. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977). A defendant is in custody for 
purposes of Miranda if he is actually in police custody or if he is deprived of his freedom 
of action in any significant way. [d. 
19. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). A defendant is interrogated 
for purposes of Miranda if he is subject to express questioning or its functional 
equivalent. [d. The functional equivalent of express questioning is words or actions on 
the part of the police that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from a defendant, within the meaning of Miranda. [d. at 301. 
20. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
21. [d. The Court did not require the police to use the Miranda warnings as set out 
in the opinion. [d. But the Court did mandate that the warnings should be used if the 
states could not devise a method of warning that would ensure that the right against 
self-incrimination would be fully honored. [d. 
22. [d. The full set of warnings that the Supreme Court prescribed are: (1) a suspect 
in custody has the right to remain silent, (2) a suspect has the right to know that any-
thing he says will be used against him, (3) a suspect has the right to an attorney before 
any questioning can take place, and (4) a suspect will be provided with a court-appointed 
attorney if the suspect cannot afford one. [d. 
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
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the suspect's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.24 
The fundamental premise of Miranda is that a defendant 
does not have to prove actual coercion to take advantage of the 
exclusionary rule. 211 In contrast, the main point of Elstad is that 
a defendant must prove actual coercion before a court will apply 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude any secondary 
evidence;26 the Miranda presumption of coercion does not apply 
to the secondary evidence.27 
In Elstad, the petitioner, Michael Elstad, was implicated in 
a burglary of a neighbor's residence.1I8 The police obtained a 
warrant for Elstad's arrest and proceeded to his house to arrest 
him.29 The policemen were admitted into the house by Elstad's 
mother.30 While one policeman sequestered the mother in the 
kitchen, the other officer questioned Elstad in the living room.31 
Elstad was not given the requisite Miranda warnings.32 The of-
ficer told Elstad that he was implicated in the burglary of his 
neighbor's residence.33 In response, Elstad made damaging ad-
missions concerning his involvement in the crime.34 The police 
then arrested311 Elstad and transported him to the police sta-
tion.36 At the police station, approximately one hour after the 
initial questioning, the police thoroughly warned Elstad of his 
Miranda rights.37 Elstad waived his rights and made a second 
confession shortly thereafter. 38 The trial court suppressed the 
initial unwarned statement pursuant to Miranda39 but, based 
24. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
25. Id. at 478-79. 
26. Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1296 (1985). 
27. Id. at 1293. 






34. Id. Elstad responded to the police officer's statement that he was involved in the 
robbery of his neighbor's house by saying, "Yes, I was there." [d. 
35. For the purpose of this appeal, the state conceeded the issue of custody even 
though Michael Elstad had not been placed under formal arrest at the time of his first 
statement. [d. at 1297. 
36. Id. at 1289. 
37. Id. 
38. [d. 
39. Id. at 1289-90. 
5
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upon the significance of the second confession, Elstad was con-
victed and sentenced to five years in prison for his participation 
in the burglary.40 
The Oregon Court of Appeals determined that the second 
confession was the fruit of the first unwarned confession, and 
therefore, could not have been a truly voluntary confession.41 
The first confession let the "cat out of the bag,""2 and there no 
longer was any reason for Elstad to remain silent.43 As a result, 
the court applied the derivative evidence rule, and excluded the 
second confession as a fruit of the first unwarned admission."" 
According to the court of appeals, the violation of Miranda was 
a constitutional violation against the fifth amendment's prohibi-
tion against self-incrimination.41i Therefore, the court applied 
the derivative evidence rule and excluded the second confession 
from evidence."6 The Oregon Supreme Court denied certiorari 
and the state appealed to the United States Supreme Court."7 
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION 
In Elstad, the Supreme Court distinguished an actual viola-
tion of a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation from a violation of the prophylactic Miranda warnings 
designed to ensure that these rights are fully honored.48 This 
distinction is the fundamental premise of Elstad."9 "The pro-
phylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights, protected 
40. [d. 
41. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. 673, 658 P.2d 552, cert. denied, 295 Or. 61.7, 670 
P.2d 1033 (1983). 
42. This meta:Jhor was first used in Bayer v. United States, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
The Court held that a second confession is not per se inadmissible simply because a first 
confession was illegal. [d. at 540-41. The Court stated that a second confession will al-
most always be the product of the first, but in this factual setting the second confession 
was attenuated, and thus, admissible. [d. The second confession was admissible if it was 
attenuated, even though, in a literal sense, it would always be the product of the first 
confession. [d. 
43. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 677, 658 P.2d at 555. 
44. [d. at 676, 658 P.2d at 554. According to the Supreme Court, a violation of a 
defendant's constitutional rights is a prerequisite of the fruits doctrine. Elstad, 105 S. 
Ct. at 1291. 
45. State v. Elstad, 61 Or. App. at 676, 658 P.2d at 554. 
46. [d. at 677, 658 P.2d at 554. 
47. Oregon v. Elstad, 104 S. Ct. 1437 (1984). 
48. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291-92. 
49. Id. at 1291. 
6
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by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected."lIo 
The Court provided several reasons for this distinction. 
First, the Miranda exclusionary rule is broader than the fifth 
amendment. III A defendant may take advantage of the Miranda 
presumption even in the absence of actual coercion by the police 
in obtaining an unwarned statement;1I2 the un warned statement 
is irrebuttably presumed coercedCi3 and excluded from evidence 
without regard to the issue of voluntariness.1I4 The Miranda rule 
was implemented to ensure that a defendant's rights are pro-
tected from the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial 
interrogation. 1111 
Second, the dual rationale of the fruits doctrine, trustwor-
thiness and deterrence,1I6 are not furthered by the extension of 
the Miranda presumption.1I7 The police are not deterred; there is 
nothing to deter because the violation of Miranda was technical 
and inadvertant. Both statements were voluntary, and therefore, 
trustworthy; the first because there was no actual coercion, and 
the second because of the thorough Miranda warnings and sub-
sequent waiver. Therefore, because the deterrent purpose of the 
fifth amendment will not be furthered by an extension of the 
Miranda presumption, the Court restricted the use of this pre-
sumption to the initial unwarned statement.1I6 
Third, the Court reasoned that it would be an "unwarranted 
and improvident" extension of Miranda to allow a person who is 
not the victim of actual coercion to take advantage of the broad 
fruits exclusionary rule.1I9 The fact-finder should not be deprived 
of highly probative secondary evidence of a voluntary confes-
sion.60 Moreover, the cost to legitimate law enforcement would 
50. Id. (quoting New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984)). 
51. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1293-94. 
54.Id. 
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966). 
56. See supra note 17. 
57. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1293. 
58. Id. at 1298. 
59. Id. at 1293-94. 
60. [d. at 1295. 
7
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be too high, and would add little to a defendant's interest 
against self-incrimination.61 A defendant, in order to come 
within the reach of the exclusion of the fruits doctrine, cannot 
rely solely upon a violation of Miranda to trigger the rule.62 
Rather, a defendant must show there was actual compulsion by 
the police in obtaining the initial statement under the due pro-
cess voluntary test.63 Whether the violation was technical or fla-
grant will be just one factor in a court's due process voluntary 
analysis.64 
Therefore, under this rationale, a prophylactic violation of 
the Miranda rules raises a presumption that only the initial un-
warned custodial confession was coerced.611 For purposes of the 
derivative evidence rule, the courts should look behind the pro-
cedural violation and determine if the initial statement was vol-
untary.66 If the statement is deemed voluntary, then there was 
no primary illegality and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
is inapplicable.67 Thorough Miranda warnings would ordinarily68 
be sufficient to cure69 the condition70 that was created through 
the inadvertant questioning of a defendant in custody.71 Thus, 
the only issues that remain are whether the suspect was advised 
of his Miranda rights, and whether he made a knowing and in-
telligent waiver of his rights before his second confession.72 
A court faced with a derivative evidence objection based 
upon a Miranda violation must analyze the case according to the 
test set forth in Elstad. 73 Initially, the court must determine if 
the violation of Miranda was technical or flagrant. Then, if the 
violation is deemed technical, unless the police deliberately co-
61. [d. 
62. [d. 
63. Id. at 1294. Due process is violated if a defendant involuntarily confesses. The 
courts have stressed the unfairness of interrogators overcoming the will of a defendant. 
Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867 (1980-81). 
64. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1298. 
65. Id. at 1292-93. 
66. Id. at 1293-94. 
67.Id. 
68. See supra note 8. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. 
71. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294. 
72. Id. at 1296. 
73. Id. at 1298. 
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erced the suspect or used improper tactics in obtaining the first 
confession, the court will consider the statement voluntary." 
Since the initial statement was voluntary, there was no primary 
violation of the defendant's constitutional rights and the fruit of 
the poisonous tree doctrine will not apply.711 The second state-
ment will then be viewed strictly according to Miranda. 76 If the 
defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and he voluntarily 
waived those rights, then the second statement will be admissi-
ble." However, if the initial violation of Miranda is deemed fla-
grant, the analysis will be different.78 The flagrancy of the viola-
tion will weigh heavily in the determination of whether the 
initial statement was voluntary.79 If the initial statement is 
deemed coerced, then the derivative evidence rule will be ap-
plied to the second warned statement.80 Thus, the new test elim-
inates the use of the Miranda presumption of coercion if the 
issue is admission of secondary evidence obtained in violation of 
Miranda. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Elstad, the Court minimized the psychological impact of 
initial unwarned admissions upon subsequent confessions with 
regard to the issue of voluntariness.81 "[T]he causal connection 
between any psychological disadvantage created by [a suspect's] 
admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate is speculative 
and attenuated at best. "82 In lightly dismissing the psychological 
effect of a first confession, the Court disregarded reality.83 A per-
son who confesses may feel that he has nothing to lose and con-
tinues to talk.84 He may even feel that if he cooperates further, 
he will obtain favored treatment. Skillful interrogators are 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 1293. 
76. [d. at 1296. 
77. [d. at 1294. 
78. [d. at 1296. 
79. [d. 
80. [d. at 1293. 
81. [d. at 1295-96. 
82. [d. at 1296. 
83. [d. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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trained to capitalize on this breakdown of a suspect's defenses.811 
In addition, the Court ignored precedent when it denied the ef-
fect of the first confession on the second confession.88 Prior deci-
sions have established that the second confession will always, in 
some manner, be the product of the first confession.87 
Additionally, the Elstad Court feared that if it recognized 
the psychological effect of a voluntary unwarned admission on a 
suspect, with regard to subsequent confessions, the police would 
be precluded from obtaining statements from that suspect.88 
"[E]ndowing the psychological effects of voluntary unwarned ad-
missions with constitutional implications would, practically 
speaking, disable the police from obtaining the suspect's in-
formed cooperation even when the official coercion proscribed by 
the fifth amendment played no part in either his warned or un-
warned confessions. "89 
The Court's fear was illusory. This disabling effect has 
never been the case, even for the most egregious fifth amend-
ment violations of the right against self-incrimination.90 The ele-
ments of attenuation91 can cure even the most blatant violation 
of a defendant's constitutional rights.9a The sliding scale of at-
85. Elstad, 105 s. Ct. at 1303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
86. United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947). In Bayer, Bayer bribed an 
army officer to keep Bayer from being shipped overseas to combat duty. Id. at 534-35. 
The army officer was convicted solely upon his confession. Subsequently, the army of-
ficer's conviction was overturned because the confession was ruled inadmissible. Id. at 
539-40. However, he was tried and convicted again based upon the strength of a second 
confession that was obtained six months after the first. Id. at 540. The court of appeals 
determined that the second confession was the fruit of the first, and therefore, was inad-
missible. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and decided that although the first confession 
let the "cat out of the bag" and that the second confession would always in some way be 
the product of the first confession, sufficient time had passed and the army officer was 
not coerced. Therefore, the second confession was voluntary and admissible. Id. at 540-
41. 
87.Id. 
88. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294-95. 
89. Id. at 1294. 
90. See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944). In Lyons, the police forced a mur-
der suspect to confess during intensive interrogation. Id. at 599-600. The police interro-
gated the suspect for over eight consecutive hours. Id. There was evidence that the police 
beat the suspect and placed a pan containing the bones of the victim in front of the 
suspect. [d. The defendant's first confession was ruled inadmissible but the Court as-
serted that the coercive effects of the first confession would be dissipated with time. Id. 
at 603-04. 
91. See supra note 11. 
92.Id. 
10
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tenuation93 is well adapted to deal with constituti6nal violations 
at either end of the spectrum, whether technical violations or 
flagrant violations.94 Therefore, the Elstad decision should have 
been premised upon an attenuation analysis instead of upon a 
Miranda analysis.95 The Court should have viewed the facts to 
determine if the second confession was attenuated. The Court 
could have analyzed the facts of Elstad as follows: (1) was the 
violation of Miranda technical or flagrant?, (2) how much time 
passed between the initial confession and the second confes-
sion?, (3) were the same officers involved?, (4) was the accused 
moved from one place to another?, (5) were thorough Miranda 
warnings given before the second confession?, and (6) did the 
defendant waive his rights? 
Based upon these factors the Court could have decided the 
case strictly according to established precedent.98 If the Court 
would have relied upon prior cases, it would not have had to 
disregard the real impact that first confessions have upon subse-
quent admissions.97 The purpose of the Miranda presumption 
would have been preserved, and the deterrence and trustworthi-
ness rationales of the derivative evidence rule would have been 
furthered. 
Moreover, the Court's analysis was much different than a 
similar analysis for a fourth amendment violation.98 The Court 
previously held that if the fruit of a fourth amendment violation 
was a confession, Miranda warnings alone do not remove the 
taint from the violation.99 On the contrary, the Miranda warn-
ings will be just one factor in the analysis of attenuation. loo 
However, as established in Elstad, when the initial violation is a 
technical violation of Miranda, Miranda warnings have a greater 
ability to cure the taint on the investigatory process. lOl Signifi-
cantly, the very same warnings that were used to protect a de-
fendant's rights against self-incrimination were used to ensure 
93. [d. 
94. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1307-08 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
95. [d. at 1307. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 1305. 
98. [d. at 1292. 
99. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). 
100. [d. 
101. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1294. 
11
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that any subsequent statement would be used against him.l02 
Unfortunately, the Elstad Court's analysis undermines the 
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court's 
decision disregards the fact that suspects often believe they will 
be convicted because of their initial confession,103 and therefore, 
they are more likely to make subsequent damaging state-
ments.104 The Court's use of these additional incriminating 
statements effectively weakens a defendant's right against self-
incrimination. lOG It is ironic that the Court has used the Mi-
randa warnings, designed to ensure that fifth amendment rights 
are fully honored,108 to limit a suspect's constitutional 
protection. 
V. SIGNIFICANCE 
The initial effect of the Elstad decision is the elimination of 
the derivative evidence rule with regard to Miranda violations 
when the secondary evidence is a subsequent warned confes-
sion.l07 Elstad and cases that have preceded it have paved the 
way for the total elimination of the fruits doctrine when there is 
a Miranda violation. lOS In Michigan u. Tucker,109 the Court held 
that a technical violation of Miranda does not warrant applica-
tion of the derivative evidence rule when the secondary evidence 
is a third party witness. After Elstad, the Court has one final 
step to eliminate the derivative evidence rule with regard to Mi-
randa violations; that step is to determine that physical evi-
dence is not tainted as a result of a technical Miranda viola-
tion.1l0 Since the Elstad Court applied the Tucker analysis, III 
102. [d. 
103. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
104. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1302 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
105. [d. at 1313-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
106. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
107. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1296. 
108. [d. at 1313 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
109. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). In Tucker, a witness was discovered as a result of ques-
tioning that violated Miranda. The witness was not considered a fruit of the violation of 
the defendant's constitutional rights because the violation of Miranda was only a viola-
tion of the procedural safeguards of Miranda. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45. Therefore, 
there was no constitutional violation, and the secondary evidence rule did not apply. [d. 
110. The Court used a three step analysis when it developed the fruits doctrine for 
fourth amendment violations. In Silverthorne, the Court established the rule with regard 
to physical evidence. Silverthorne Lumber Company v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 
12
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the Court, when faced with physical evidence as the fruit of a 
technical Miranda violation, will apply Tucker, and allow the 
physical evidence to be admitted.l12 
Justice Brennan dissented in Elstad, and voiced this con-
cern. ll3 He was fearful that the Court would foreclose applica-
tion of the derivative evidence rule in all instances of a technical 
violation of a Miranda warning.1I4 He attempted to distinguish 
the holdings of Tucker and Elstad. llCi According to Justice Bren-
nan, the majority in both decisions heavily relied upon the ex-
tent of a suspect's volition in successive confession cases and 
third party witness cases.1I6 If a suspect retains his individual 
volition, the second confession or testimony will be insulated 
from the taint of the unwanted admissions.1l7 The fact that a 
person can exercise his free will to testify or confess was an im-
portant factor to the Elstad and Tucker Courts. liS As noted by 
Justice Brennan, this insulating factor is absent in cases In 
which the fruit of the poisonous tree is physical evidence.lIs 
Nevertheless, the Elstad majority asserted that a violation 
of the prophylactic rules of Miranda, alone, is never a constitu-
tional violation.120 This premise will be rigidly followed by the 
Court, and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, with regard 
to violations of the procedural rules of Miranda, will be elimi-
nated; all secondary evidence will be admissible.lU As a result, 
the courts will be forced to revert to the factual, case-by-case 
inquiry of voluntariness before they will apply the derivative ev-
idence rule to a violation of Miranda. 122 
(1920). In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court extended the doc-
trine to verbal evidence. [d. at 484-87. In United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), 
the Court ruled that a third party witness may be excluded as a fruit of a constitutional 
violation if the defendant can show there was a very direct link to the violation. [d. at 
280. 
111. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291. 
112. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
113. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1299 n.2, 1313 n.29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
114. [d. 





120. [d. at 1294. 
121. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
122. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1324 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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The majority's decisions in this area tend to preserve the 
status of Miranda but to restrict its expansion. The Court is still 
adhering to the guidelines of the Miranda presumption but it is 
refusing to extend the decision in any direction.123 For example, 
in New York v. Quarles,12. Justice O'Connor stated, "[W]here 
the accused only proves that the police failed to administer Mi-
randa warnings, exclusion of the statement itself is all that will 
and should be required."126 
The ultimate impact of Elstad, is that it may lead to the 
eventual overruling of Miranda. 126 The Court took the first step 
in that direction when it distinguished between actual coercion 
and presumed coercion.127 Under this distinction, the Miranda 
warnings are prophylactic rules, and are not constitutionally 
necessary;128 the Constitution simply requires an absence of ac-
tual coercion in obtaining a confession.129 Since the Miranda 
warnings only raise a presumption of coercion, they are not con-
stitutionally mandated,130 and therefore, can be eliminated. 
Statements obtained by the police in violation of Miranda will 
no longer be presumed coerced. Miranda warnings may still be 
required, but their presence or absence will be only one factor in 
determining if a confession has been obtained through actual co-
123. In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the Supreme Court refused to 
extend the Miranda presumption to exclude evidence obtained in violation of Miranda 
that was used for impeachment purposes. [d. at 226. In addition, the Quarles Court fash-
ioned the only real exception to the Miranda safeguards. 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). In 
Quarles, the Court allowed evidence obtained in violation of Miranda to be used in the 
case in chief against the defendant basing its decision on the compelling need of public 
and police safety. [d. at 2632-33. 
124. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (O'Connor, J., dissenting and concurring). In Quarles, 
the police apprehended a suspected rapist. The victim had informed the police that the 
suspect was carrying a gun. The police searched the suspect and found a shoulder holster 
but did not find a gun. The officers, before administering the required Miranda warn-
ings, asked the suspect where the gun was; the suspect complied. The Court allowed the 
statement of the suspect into evidence based upon a public safety exception to Miranda. 
[d. at 2632. The Court held that if a police officer is motivated by a genuine concern for 
public safety then that need outweighs the requirement that the officer administer Mi-
randa warnings before questioning the suspect. [d. at 2633. 
125. [d. at 2641 (emphasis added). 
126. See Kamisar, supra note 17, at S22. 
127. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). 
128. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1291 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 
187 (1977)). 
129. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1292. 
130. [d. 
14
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ercion. The analysis will be similar to the analysis of Elstad;ISI 
was there actual, not presumed, coercion in obtaining the initial 
statement. If there was no actual coercion, the statement will be 
admissible. . 
If the Court overrules Miranda and reverts to the voluntary 
test, a curious use of the Miranda warnings may occur. Miranda 
warnings may still be required, but the presumption of coercion 
will not apply. However, a different presumption may result. 
The presumption will not be of coercion, but of voluntariness. 
The courts will view Miranda warnings as an extra effort to en-
sure that any confession obtained was voluntary. A defendant 
will have to overcome this presumption and prove that a confes-
sion was obtained through actual coercion. This turn of events 
will be an interesting use of the presumption that was intended 
to ensure that a suspect's right against self-incrimination has 
been fully honored. 
In light of the decision in Elstad, a significant question re-
mains to be answered. What impact will the decision have on 
the deterrence rationale of the Miranda presumption and the 
fruits doctrine? The police may utilize the Elstad decision to au-
thorize inadvertant questioning of a suspect, in violation of Mi-
randa, with the hope of obtaining secondary information that 
may be more valuable than obtaining a conviction for the origi-
nal violation. This is a real concern. lS2 One does not have to 
search far to find examples of police conduct designed to take 
advantage of a legal doctrine. 
One example is the use of the plain view doctrine as a pre-
text for a general search. ISS In Sanderson v. Superior Court of 
Stanislaus County/s. police officers attempted to manipulate 
the use of the doctrine by moving a defendant from room to 
room while they questioned him, with the hope of finding evi-
dence in plain view. lsil It is not difficult to imagine a resourceful 
131. [d. at 1296. 
132. [d. at 1318-19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
133. If the police are lawfully in a certain place and inadvertantiy view evidence of a 
crime, they may lawfully seize evidence that is in plain view. Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Moreover, the Court asserted that the use of the plain view 
doctrine may not be used as a pretext for a general exploratory search. [d. at 466. 
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police officer attempting to utilize the Elstad precedent in a sim-
ilar manner. For example, a police officer, intent upon arresting 
a suspect, may "inadvertently" question him in the non-threat-
ening environment of the suspect's home. ls6 If the suspect an-
swers, the reply will be inadmissible pursuant to Miranda, but 
any subsequent Mirandized admission due to the suspect's 
weakened state will be admissible. IS? 
The first admission is always the hardest admission for in-
terrogators to obtain. ls8 If the police are permitted to obtain the 
initial statement in violation of Miranda without fear of the 
fruits doctrine, then the deterrence rationale of the fifth amend-
ment will be substantially impaired, and the decisions in Elstad 
and Tucker will not have served their purpose. 
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO THE COURT'S HOLDING 
There were two possible alternatives to the Court's solution 
to the procedural violation of the prophylactic rules designed to 
safeguard Elstad's fifth amendment rights. The first alternative 
was to decide the case strictly according to the fruit of the poi-
sonous tree doctrine by applying the doctrine of attenuation. lSB 
If Miranda was violated, there was a primary illegality and the 
courts should look to the factors of attenuation in determining 
the admissibility of any secondary evidence. ao The deterrence 
rationale of the exclusionary rule would be preserved, and crimi-
nal procedure would remain relatively straight forward with re-
gard to fifth amendment violations. al 
The second alternative was to require the police officers to 
give supplemental information to Elstad explaining that his first 
statement was made without proper Miranda warnings, and 
therefore, might be inadmissible in court against him. a2 In this 
136. Elstad. 105 S. Ct. at 1289. 
137. [d. at 1296. 
138. [d. at 1303-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
139. See supra note 11. 
140. [d. 
141. Justice Stevens voiced this concern in his dissent. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. at 1324 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). He was afraid that if the Court reverted to the use of the volun-
tary test. the Court would be forced into the factual inquiries of voluntariness that Mi-
randa avoided. [d. 
142. The defendant in Elstad advanced this argument which was expressly rejected 
16
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way, Elstad could have voluntarily waived his right to remain 
silent after receiving the proper warnings. He would have had all 
the essential information necessary to make a knowing, intelli-
gent, and voluntary waiver. 143 
The psychological impact in cases of consecutive confes-
sions, when one confession closely follows the other confession, 
is magnified, so that the second confession can never be volun-
tary in the non coercive sense. 1 .. The first confession is itself co-
ercive in the mind of a suspect;141i Miranda warnings alone can-
not cure the coercive impact of the first confession. A simple 
additional warning to the thorough Miranda admonition that 
the previous statement may not be admissible, will cure this de-
fect. Therefore, any additional statement will be a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of a defendant's constitutional 
rights. 146 
The Miranda warnings are well known and relatively sim-
ple.147 A supplemental warning; will not detract from this sim-
plicity. The rights of an accused will be scrupulously honored 
and the burden on law enforcement will be minimal. Anything 
less than supplemental warnings will not be sufficient, and will 
undermine the integrity of the fact finding system. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court has created a new area of criminal 
procedure that will burden the courts with tedious fact-finding 
litigation whenever the police discover evidence as a result of a 
Miranda violation. A primary confession will be inadmissible, 
pursuant to Miranda, but any secondary statement will have to 
be examined according to the factors in Elstad. Was the initial 
confession voluntary according to the old due process voluntary 
test? If the answer is yes, then there has been no primary viola-
tion of the rights of the defendant and the derivative evidence 
doctrine is inapplicable; therefore, the second statement will 
by the Court. ld. at 1297. 
143. ld. at 1308-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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have to be examined to determine if it is admissible. Have 
proper Miranda warnings been given to the defendant? If the 
answer is yes, ordinarily this will be sufficient to cure the condi-
tion that was created by an inadvertant violation of Miranda, 
and the defendant can make a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
his constitutional rights. 
The Court's decision ignored the psychological impact of a 
first confession upon a defendant. By allowing the courts to use 
a confession that has been obtained when a defendant is in a 
compromised psychological state, the Supreme Court has under-
mined the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. In 
addition, the fifth amendment has been further weakened by 
employing the Miranda warnings to ensure that any subsequent 
confession is used against a defendant; the Miranda warnings 
were designed to ensure that fifth amendment rights are 
honored. The Court should have used the analysis of attenua-
tion, or alternatively, mandated that police officers give a sup-
plemental warning that a first confession may be inadmissible 
whenever Miranda is violated. This additional safeguard would 
have guaranteed that a defendant's fifth amendment rights 
would be scrupulously honored. 
The result of this watering down of the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination may lead to the eventual 
overruling of Miranda. But, at the very least, the Elstad deci-
sion will lead to an increase in the complexity of criminal proce-
dure. In the words of Justice O'Connor, there will be "a finespun 
new doctrine on [fifth amendment litigation] complete with hair 
splitting distinctions that currently plague our Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence."148 
Marte J. Bassi* 
148. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring 
and dissenting). 
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